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Abstract: This paper applies multivariate Blanchard-Perotti SVAR methodology to analyze 
disaggregated short-term effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates in Egypt and 
Tunisia. The main finding of this paper is that, strong evidence shows that fiscal policy procyclical 
in Egypt and Tunisia. This procyclicality arises from the weakness of automatic stabilizers and the 
procyclical bias of discretionary fiscal policy.  
The principal results of this paper are:  (i) positive shocks to government spending caused crowding 
out effects. (ii) The impact of fiscal shocks on inflation and interest rates is mostly economic 
counterintuitive. Revenue shock in the short term decreases inflation and interest rate in Egypt and 
increases inflation and interest rate in Tunisia.  An expenditure shock decreases inflation and 
interest rate in Egypt. The case of Tunisia seems to be more economically intuitive, in fact, an 
expenditure shock decreases inflation, in the short run, while in the medium run, inflation increases 
above the initial level, while interest rate acts in the opposite direction.  
JEL Classifications: E32, E62; H30, H50; C12  
Keywords: SVAR model, Fiscal shocks, Government spending, Tax revenues 
1. Introduction  
Fiscal policy is assessed to have significant effects both on micro-decisions of economic agents 
as well as on aggregate economic activity. In this context, government is an important player in any 
economy, and its fiscal policies regarding taxes and spending affect disposable income, 
consumption, investment and private agent’s decisions in general. Nevertheless, compared to the 
large empirical evidence on the effects of monetary policy, research on fiscal policy effects has 
received much less attention. In many ways, this is due to the political dependence but also because 
of its complexity and distributional dimension. Consequently, the apprehension on the effects of 
fiscal policy remains limited (Leeper (2010)). This lack of attention contrasts with recent public 
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debates on the role of fiscal policy in the period of crisis (Spilimbergo et al. (2008), Alfonso et al. 
(2010).  
Furthermore, researcher’s views on both the short run and long run effects of fiscal policy 
remain rather mixed. This heterogeneity is also in line with divergent theoretical underpinnings: 
neoclassical models state that the private consumption should fall following a positive shock to 
government consumption via the so-called crowding out effect, while models with (neo) Keynesian 
features find the opposite (Woodford (2010)).  
Although the theoretical literature is well developed for fiscal policy but it has received much 
less attention in applied economic research until recently. The empirical literature on fiscal policy 
can be grouped into three categories. The first category focuses on the evaluation of the 
macroeconomic impact of large reductions in the budget deficit. The second line of research 
analyzes the stabilization capability of fiscal policy variables. Finally, the dynamic effects of 
discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables have recently been revived within the 
framework of vector auto-regression in the work of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).      
This new empirical macroeconomics has been applied mainly for developed economies while 
developing economies have received little attention so far in these applications, in spite of its 
relevance to tackle real policy issues such as fiscal policy. Countries such as Tunisia and Egypt are 
currently faced with sharp shocks such as temporary expansionary fiscal policy needed to respond 
to the new aspirations of their citizens.  Additional budgets have been put in place in order to 
accommodate these new expectations.  
This paper aims at addressing these issues within the SVAR framework used in Perotti (2002). 
The objective of this paper is to estimate a SVAR model for Tunisia and Egypt and to use it for the 
simulation of such policy shocks. We would like to assess whether additional temporary 
government spending is likely to help achieve merely social goals or to result in real effects on 
economic activity and employment. To this end, the results of fiscal shocks on economic activity, 
inflation and interest rate will be shown and analyzed. Fiscal shocks are disaggregated into two 
components: revenue and expenditure shocks, so the difference between the effects of these shocks, 
the mutual influence and the intensity and duration will be examined.  
Hence, this paper aims to examine the implication of the use of disaggregated fiscal policy 
instruments and to investigate the strength of fiscal policy in terms of business cycle smoothing. 
The empirical research will provide answers to the fundamental questions of this paper, referring to 
the direction, intensity, and duration of disaggregated macroeconomic consequence of fiscal shocks.  
This paper is organized as follow: Section 2 presents theoretical and empirical reviews. Section 
3 outlines the specification of the VAR model and the identification method. Section 4 discusses the 
effects of fiscal shocks. In addition, section 5 presents conclusion and policy recommendations. 
2. Empirical Reviews 
To analyze the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity, the empirical literature includes 
three types of studies. First, one based on the estimation of fiscal multipliers through 
macroeconomic model simulations and reduced form equations. Second studies, which analyze the 
episodes of fiscal contraction. Third studies which evaluate the determinants of fiscal multipliers 
and elaborate the relationship between fiscal policy, interest rates, investment and exchange rates. 
To derive the estimates for multipliers, empirical literature employs two types of models; large 
macroeconomic models estimated empirically such as the IMF MULTIMOD Model (Saito (1997)) 
and Small Dynamic General Equilibrium Models that are calibrated and then solved numerically 
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(Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Devereux et al (1996), Ramey and Shapiro (1998)). However, 
these estimates depend on the specification of fiscal policy shocks, the monetary policy response 
function and the extent to which expectations are forward looking (Hemming (2002)). 
There are number of studies, which employ reduced form equations to evaluate the impact of 
fiscal policy on output (Romer and Romer (2007), Perry and Schultz (1993)). Barro (1981) finds 
that temporary changes in defence spending have strong positive effect on output. While estimating 
the fiscal policy effects on activity, endogeneity problem can be dealt with by the identification of 
exogenous fiscal shocks. Ramey and Shapiro (1997) identify three episodes of sharply increased 
military spending and use these as dummy variables in a univariate autoregressive equation for 
GDP.  
Due to the institutional factors and data deficiencies, little empirical literature is available on 
the short-term effects of fiscal policy on economic activity for developing countries. Gupta et al. 
(2005) examine the fiscal adjustment and expenditure composition on growth in short run for 39 
low-income countries. They find that one percent reduction in the deficit to GDP ratio results in per 
capita real growth of 0.25 to 0.5 percent in the short run and Keynesian effects of fiscal policy are 
larger for those low-income countries who have achieved fiscal and macro stability. Haque and 
Montiel (1991) estimate a dynamic, small open economy Mundell Fleming model for a sample of 
31 developing countries and suggest that a short and medium term effects of increased government 
spending are contractionary while there is no long-term effect.  
Recursive approach. This approach identify the VAR model using Cholesky decomposition 
(recursive ordering) as suggested by Sims (1980). Fatas and Mihov (2001) applied Sims method to 
fiscal VAR model to identify fiscal shocks. According to this approach, the first variable ordered in 
the system (government spending in the three variables VAR) responds only to its own exogenous 
shock. The next variable (output) responds to government spending contemporaneously and to its 
own shock. The third variable, taxes, ordered last will respond contemporaneously to both variables 
(government spending and output). The advantage of this method is its simplicity, so the results are 
strongly sensitive to the ordering of variables in the model.  
Sign restriction approach. This approach was developed by Montford and Uhlig (2002) by 
using sign restriction to identify fiscal shocks while controlling for the monetary and business cycle 
shocks. The identification method of imposing sign restriction on impulse response functions helps 
in addressing three main difficulties in using vector auto-regression: firstly the distinction between 
systematic discretionary shocks and automatic response of fiscal variables to business and monetary 
shocks, secondly the definition of fiscal shock and thirdly the issue of lag between the 
announcement and the implementation of fiscal policy since the announcement may results in 
changes in macroeconomic variables before there are movements in the fiscal variables. This 
approach in contrast to the other approaches relies on macroeconomic time series data alone for 
shock identification and does not require assumption about the sluggish reaction of some variables 
to the macroeconomic shocks (Montford and Uhlig (2002)).  
Narrative approach. The last approach is the narrative approach/ the dummy variable or the 
event study approach developed by Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Eichenbaum, Edelberg and Fisher 
(1999) to identify the periods of military build-ups for the US economy. They tried to capture the 
dynamic effects of a shock in government spending by constituting dummy variables for the 
increase in government defence spending. Assumption is that these build-ups are exogenous to GDP 
and unanticipated by the private sector. The fiscal shock is identified by tracing the impulse 
response of the date dummies. The response of private consumption to a fiscal policy shock was 
founded negative.   
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Blanchard and Perroti approach. This approach is applied by Blanchard and Perroti (2002). 
The authors apply a methodology, which combines institutional information and SVAR analysis. 
This is also the approach taken in this paper and is discussed further in the following sections.  
3. Econometric Approach  
This section describes the model and approach for estimating the effects of fiscal policy on 
economic activity. 
 3.1 Specification  
Our identification of fiscal policy shocks is based on the methodology of Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) and Perotti (2002). Their approach is closely related to the one proposed by Bernanke and 
Mihov (1996). The main idea is to exploit fiscal policy decision lags to identify discretionary fiscal 
policy shocks.  
As usual, the strategy to identify the structural shocks in VAR model consists on imposing 
restrictions based on economic theory and the behaviour of policy makers.  
The reduced form VAR model is defined by the following dynamic equation:  
  ttt UXLCX  1  
Where  RPYGTAX t ,,,, , and  RtptYtGtTAtt uuuuuU ,,,, .   tt ULCX ,,  are respectively the 
vector of endogenous variables, an autoregressive lag polynomial in the operator L and the vector 
of reduced form residuals.  
Three variables are retained to capture the effect of fiscal policy on economic activity. 
TApresents real net taxes, G real government spending and Y real GDP. All variables are log-
transformed. The variable P represents price level measured from GDP deflator. R measures short 
term interest rate. We assume these two variables to control the impact of the monetary policy.  
Data are extracted from databases IFS, WDI, and GFS. We use quarterly data, because this is 
essential for identification of the fiscal shocks. The number of lags for the VAR is chosen to be four 
as suggested by the Akaike information (AIC). The residuals of the 4-lags VAR model appear to be 
serially uncorrelated, further supporting this lag length choice.  
3.2 Identification Method  




tu can be thought as linear 
combinations of three types of shocks: first, the automatic response taxes and government spending 
to innovation in output, prices and interest rates. In the case of the residual from the net tax 
equation, it is useful to think of this component as the unanticipated changes in taxes in response to 
output innovations, given the tax rates and the definition of tax base. Second, the systematic, 
discretionary response of policymakers to output, price and interest rate innovations; again in the 
case of the net tax residual, it is useful to think of this component as change in tax rates in response 
to output innovations. Third, random discretionary shocks to fiscal policies; these are “structural” 
fiscal shocks, which unlike the reduced form residuals are uncorrelated with each other and with all 
other structural shocks (Perotti (2002)).   
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We follow the identification method proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti 
(2002). As it is standard in the literature on Structural VAR, we assume the following relationship 
between the reduced form residual tU , and the structural shocks tV  
tt BVAU   
Where the structural innovations tV are assumed orthogonal, the covariance matrix is assumed an 
identity matrix   IVVE tt ' . Only fiscal shocks have a clear economic interpretation in our 
analysis.  
The matrix A and B describe the instantaneous relations between the reduced form residuals 
and the structural shocks, we can obtain the structural form of the VAR by pre-multiplying (1) by 
the matrix A: 
    ttttt BVYLACAUYLACAY   11  







































































The coefficients ji, capture both the automatic elasticity of fiscal variable i  to the 
“macroeconomic” variables j  and the discretionary change in variable i  enacted by the 
policymaker in response to an innovation in these macro variables. The coefficients ji , measure 
instead how the structural shock to the fiscal variables affect contemporaneously the fiscal 
variable i . To estimate the effects of unexpected exogenous changes in fiscal policy, one is 




tv   




tv , and 
studying the responses of the macroeconomic variables, in particular real GDP, to these shocks. To 
identify these two structural shocks we need to impose further restrictions. Here we use the 
observation made by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2002) that is takes policymakers and 
legislatures more than a quarter to react to a GDP shock. This virtually eliminates the possibility of 
discretionary adjustment of fiscal policy in response to unexpected movements in GDP, inflation 
and interest rate.   
Still, without further restrictions, one would not be able to identify the coefficient ji , ; for 








t uuu ,,   is equivalently to a Choleski 
decomposition where fiscal policy variables are ordered at last which would not provide a 
consistent estimate of ty , since output, inflation and interest rates could all respond to fiscal 
shocks in the same quarter. In order to identify the system, we need an external estimate of the 
automatic contemporaneous elasticities ji, .  
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The approach used here was based on two assumptions. It takes longer than three months to 
decide and implement a discretionary change in fiscal policy in response to observed output or price 




tu is zero: the coefficients ji, reflect only the first component, the automatic response to 




tv are correlated with the reduced form residuals. We compute these elasticities based on 
institutional information, as described in Appendix. With these elasticities, one can define the 









tv must be identified. To do so, one needs to take stance on the relative ordering of 
the two cyclically adjusted fiscal policy shocks; that is to decide which fiscal variable reacts to the 
other contemporaneously. One could assume that tax shocks come first; in this case 0tg in (3a) 
comes first and one can estimate gt in (3b) by simple OLS regression of the cyclically adjusted 








; a symmetric 
procedure applies if government spending shocks comes first.  
The coefficients of the equations of real GDP, GDP deflator and interest rate can be estimated 
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t vvvv ,,, as instruments.  
It is necessary to point out some facts regarding the nature of the fiscal shocks whose effects 




tv represent a one-time increase in expenditures or revenues by 
one standard deviation compared to the average of period. Perotti (2002) points out that although 
one can argue that due to the nature of the budget process there is only one fiscal shock per year, in 
practice the fiscal authorities with numerous revisions and changes in tax policy often change the 
course of fiscal policy.  
3.2.1 Unit Root Tests   
Tables 1 and 2 present the results of the standard augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Philips-
Perron (PP) unit-root tests. The test was performed with the inclusion of both an intercept and a 
linear trend. Results indicate the acceptance of a null hypothesis of a unit root at 5% significance for 
all variables in level. However, the hypothesis of unit roots in first differences can be rejected at 5% 







































Review of Economics & Finance 
~ 87 ~ 
 
Table1. Unit root tests: Egypt 
 Level First Difference 
Tests Variables t statistics Order of integrat.ion Variables t-statistics Order of  integrat.ion 
ADF 
LTA -1.210991 I(1) LTA -10.75947 I(0) 
LG -1.625940 I(1) LG -5.638964 I(0) 
LGDP 0.219750 I(1) LGDP -2.901023 I(0) 
P 0.346697 I(1)  P -3.620131 I(0) 
R -0.693073 I(1) R -3.764328 I(0) 
PP 
LTA -1.433177 I(1) LTA -6.263801 I(0) 
LG -1.294720 I(1) LG -4.802718 I(0) 
LGDP -1.647811 I(1) LGDP -3.750846 I(0) 
P -1.167541 I(1)  P -3.757451 I(0) 
R -0.867442 I(1) R -3.739658 I(0) 
ADF 
Critical values 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
Constance -3.510259 -2.896346 -2.585396 -3.511262 -2.896779 -2.585626 
Intercept & trend -4.071006 -3.464198 -3.158586 -4.072415 -3.464865 -3.158974 
PP 
Constance -3.507394 -2.895109 -2.584738 -3.508326 -2.895512 -2.584952 
Intercept & trend -4.066981 -3.462292 -3.157475 -4.068290 -3.462912 -3.157836 
Table2. Unit root tests: Tunisia  
 Level First Difference 
Tests Variables t statistics Order of integrat.ion Variables t statistics Order of integrat.ion 
ADF 
LTA -0.173403 I(1) LTA -7.775333 I(0) 
LG -2.544134 I(1) LG -3.557635 I(0) 
LGDP -1.605715 I(1) LGDP -6.092533 I(0) 
P 1.542525 I(1)  P -4.643840 I(0) 
R -1.440942 I(1) R -4.388473 I(0) 
PP 
LTA 0.562834 I(1) LTA -5.608914 I(0) 
LG -1.767039 I(1) LG -10.90818 I(0) 
LGDP -1.597621 I(1) LGDP -4.973357 I(0) 
P 1.228620 I(1)  P -4.334442 I(0) 
R -0.943259 I(1) R -5.905666 I(0) 
ADF 
Critical values 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
Constance -3.510259 -2.896346 -2.585396 -3.511262 -2.896779 -2.585626 
Intercept & trend -4.071006 -3.464198 -3.158586 -4.072415 -3.464865 -3.158974 
PP 
Constance -3.507394 -2.895109 -2.584738 -3.508326 -2.895512 -2.584952 
Intercept & trend -4.066981 -3.462292 -3.157475 -4.068290 -3.462912 -3.157836 
3.2.2 Cointegration Tests  
As unit root tests indicate the existence of a unit root a cointegration test was the next step. The 
results are presented in table 3 and 4. The results of Johansen cointegration tests identify two long 
run relationships among the variables. Such a result suggests that a Structural Vector Error 
Correction Model could be estimated to consider the cointegration relations.. The absence of 
cointegration relationships that are economically relevant Biau and Girard (2005), reject SVECM 
specification. In addition, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) find no significant difference in results 
when imposing the cointegration relationship among the variables. Consequently, the SVAR model 
in this analysis is specified in levels.  
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Table 3. Cointegration test: Egypt 
Hypothesis   Trace statistic  
0.05 
Probability 










  40.17493  0.0122 
At most 2  23.34115  24.27596  0.0653 
At most 3  4.364148  12.32090  0.6582 
At most 4  0.989847  4.129906  0.3710 
Note: Asterisks ** and *** imply statistical significance at the levels of 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Table 4. Cointegration test: Tunisia 













  63.87610  0.0270 
At most 2  39.97576  42.91525  0.0955 
At most 3  18.17815  25.87211  0.3321 
At most 4  6.854175  12.51798  0.3600 
Note: Asterisks ** and *** imply statistical significance at the levels of 5% and 1%, respectively. 
4. Empirical Results  
Plots in figures 1, 2, 3, 4 display the dynamic impact of government expenditures and taxes 
upon the GDP, inflation and interest rates for a horizon of 10 quarters, the shock amounting to a 
positive innovation (increase) of both the fiscal variables. Each graph includes a point estimation of 
impulse response functions as well as lower and upper bounds for 95 per cent confidence interval. 
As usual, the solid lines depict the variable percent change in response to a standard deviation of 
one in the respective fiscal variable whereas the dotted lines represent the 95 per cent error bands.  
While interpreting the fiscal variables shocks one should have in mind that shocks from 
government spending or revenues are not caused by any of the other variables in the model, because 
the structural shocks are derived from residuals of the VAR equation.   
4.1 Effects of Government Spending  
In this section, we comment the response of the fiscal and the macroeconomic variables to 
exogenous shocks to government spending. The impulse responses are constructed assuming a 
shock equal to a standard deviation of one. The response of variables to positive innovations in 
government spending shows behavioural patterns that cast doubts on the real effect of shocks. The 
magnitude of impact upon GDP, inflation and interest rates were surprisingly minimal following a 
standard deviation of one increase in fiscal variables.     
Figure 1 shows the responses of endogenous variables to a positive shock in government 
expenditure in Tunisia. It reflects that an increase in government spending raises the real GDP in the 
short run and this result is persistent over six quarter’s times. It increases on impact by around 0.07 
percentage points and then it increases further to reach a peak of 0.15 percentage points in the 3
th
 
quarter. It slowly returns to trend by the end of 6
th
 quarter after which it turns into a negative effect.  
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Figure 1. Impulse Response Functions of 
Government Spending in Tunisia 
Figure 2. Impulse Response Functions of 
Government Spending in Egypt 
    
Figure 2 presents the impulse response functions for Egypt. It reveals that real GDP falls in 
case of expansive fiscal policy in terms of high government spending in the short run. The 
mentioned effect vanishes within four quarters. It decreases on impact by around -0.03 percentage 
points. After four quarters, it turns into a positive effect and reach a peak of +0.001 percentage 
points. A possible explanation of this unconventional direction of influence (negative effect) may be 
the predominant of the crowding out effects of private investment as against the output effect in 
Egypt.  
 Figures 2 and 3 show the cumulative responses of output to government spending shock for 
each country. With the cumulative responses, we present the total increase of GDP during the 
period due to fiscal policy shock.  
In Tunisia, the cumulative response of GDP to a shock in spending is positive throughout the 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of INTEREST to EXPENDITURE
ISSNs: 1923-7529; 1923-8401  © 2013 Academic Research Centre of Canada 
~ 90 ~ 
 
multipliers value is still less than one. The GDP responses to government spending shocks appear 
quite small, if compared to standard textbook presentations of the impact of fiscal expansions. In 
Egypt, the cumulative response of GDP to a spending shock is negative during all shown period.  
In conclusion, in Tunisia and for GDP case, the impulse response pattern permits to infer that, 
the fiscal shock gives way to a typical but limited Keynesian demand push, lasting for six quarters; 
it is worth stressing here that apart from the fact that the lack of persistence is accompanied by a 
rather negligible response size (less than 0.2 percent), the response soon becomes negative raising 







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Figure 3. Accumulated Impulse Response 
Functions of Government Spending in Tunisia 
(Five plots on the left) 
 
Figure 4. Accumulated Impulse Response 
Functions of Government Spending in Egypt 
(Five plots on the right) 
The effect of an expenditure shock on revenues appears quite small and disappears after four to 
five quarters. This effect is in line with the growing public debt, because if taxes are not sufficiently 
responsive to increase in government expenditure, the needed fund will be debt-financed. 
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Expenditures are quickly stabilized after the initial shock of spending, from which it is evident that 
future level of government spending do not depend on independent expenditures shocks. 
Higher government spending brings about a positive response of Consumer Price Index. In 
Tunisia, spending shock has a minimal effect on inflation (0.02 percentage points) that vanishes 
within two quarter. This increase is entirely offset in the second quarter. Afterwards the effects are 
negligible. The response of the price level is close to zero during the remaining period. The limited 
response of inflation to government spending shock is in line with results obtained by other studies 
(Perotti (2002), Henry, et al (2004)).  
For Egypt, expenditure shock has a more pronounced inflationary effect. The response of 
inflation rate is hump-shaped. Initially, the inflation rate falls by -0.15 percentages points, 
afterwards it increases and remains constantly positive. It reaches a peak in the 5
th
 quarter, at 0.15 
percentages points.    
An expenditure shock lowers the interest rate within one quarter and again raises it above the 
initial level at which it is maintained for seven quarter in Tunisia. In Egypt, expenditure shock on 
interest rate has insignificant effect in the first three quarters after which it turns into a negative 
effect.  
4.2 Effects of Tax Revenues   
In this section, we present the response of the fiscal and the macroeconomic variables to 
exogenous shocks to tax revenues. Figures 5 and 6 plot the impulse responses of tax revenue in 
Tunisia and Egypt; Figures 7 and 8 plot the accumulated impulse response in Tunisia and Egypt, 
respectively. The impulse responses are constructed assuming a shock equal to a standard deviation 
of one. It is important to highlight in the beginning that the effect of a standard deviation of one 
increase in tax revenues on GDP, inflation and interest rates were surprisingly minimal.  
In Egypt, revenue shock on GDP has negative effect in the first two quarters after which it 
turns into a positive, but volatile effect. After 8 quarters, the mentioned effect vanishes. It decreases 
in impact by around -0.2% percentage points and then it increases further to reach a peak of 0.2 
percentage points in the 5
th
 quarter. It slowly returns to trend by the end of 8
th
 after which it turns 
into negative effect. The cumulative response of GDP to a revenue shock is positive along time 
horizon.  
In Tunisia, the impulse response function shows the opposite pattern. In fact, revenue shock on 
GDP has positive effect in the first four quarters after which it turns into a negative effect. It 
increases in impact by around 0.5% percentage points after then it decreases further to reach a 
trough of -0.5 percentage points in the 8
th
 quarter.  
The cumulative response of GDP to a revenue shock is negative in the period of shock and in 
the first quarters. It becomes positive in the 4
th
 quarter and remains positive until the end of the 
presented period.   
Product’s negative response to shocks to taxes depicted by the graph for at least two quarters in 
Egypt and four quarters in Tunisia seems to be somehow agreeing with supply-side supporters’ 
view that a displacement of private economic activity is to be expected soon after a tax increase. 
Nevertheless, the markedly low impact along time horizon calls for caution when uttering definite 
conclusions. 
Government spending falls in case of tight fiscal policy in terms of high tax revenue in Tunisia. 
This finding is theoretically inconsistent because higher revenues encourage government spending. 
In Egypt revenues shock increases government expenditures after two quarters of negative effect.  
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Figure 5. Impulse Response Functions of Tax 
Revenue in Tunisia 
Figure 6. Impulse Response Functions of Tax 
Revenue in Egypt 
In both countries, revenues shocks have a minimal effect on inflation. In Tunisia, the initial 
four quarter revenue shock effect on inflation is positive when it turns to the negative effect, which 
prevails until the 10
th
 quarter, which is consistent with the textbook knowledge of the economic 
policy of stable exchange rate (Gartner (2006), Mankiw (2007)). A tax shock raises inflation the 
first six months and then it stabilizes in spite of the presence of the permanent effect of taxes. This 
is because the shock is implemented in the inflationary expectations after one year. So, for Egypt an 
increase in tax revenues decrease inflation in short term. This effect is persistent over four quarter’s 
times after which it turns into positive effect during two quarters and then become negative until the 
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Revenues shocks have the greatest impact on the interest rate in Tunisia. In Egypt, the impact 
is surprisingly minimal, so the directions of effects are in line with the conclusion of textbook on a 
stable exchange rate (Gartner (2006), Mankiw (2007)). Interest rate reacts negatively to the tax 
shock, and return to the initial level. In Tunisia, the initial four quarter tax shock effect on interest 
rate is positive when it turns to the negative effect that prevails until the 9
th
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Figure 7. Accumulated Impulse Response 
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5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations  
In this paper, the effects of fiscal policy shocks on the Tunisian and Egyptian economies are 
quantified using the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) SVAR approach. This paper has studied the 
effects of fiscal policy on GDP, inflation and interest rate.  
According to the impulse response functions, we can conclude that: (1) positive shocks to 
government spending caused increasing production impact but soon after the plot’s decreasing 
pattern supplied crowding out evidence. (2) The interest rate shows the relatively strongest response 
to fiscal shocks, while the inflation shows the weakest response. (3) The impact of fiscal shocks on 
inflation and interest rates is mostly counterintuitive. Revenue shock in the short term decreases 
inflation and interest rate in Egypt and increases inflation and interest rate in Tunisia. An 
expenditure shock decreases inflation and interest rate in Egypt. The case of Tunisia seems to be 
more economically intuitive, in fact, an expenditure shock decreases inflation, in the short run, 
while in the medium run, inflation increases above the initial level, while interest rate acts in the 
opposite direction.  
We believe that the contribution of this paper is in study of the consequences of fiscal policy 
on inflation and interest rate, and separately observing the effects of fiscal policy instruments, as 
well testing their mutual influence.  
The main finding of our paper is that there is strong evidence that fiscal policy is procyclical in 
Egypt and Tunisia. This procyclicality arises from both the weakness of automatic stabilizers and 
the procyclical bias of discretionary fiscal policies.    
Despite the fact that in industrial countries countercyclical discretionary policy contributes to 
dampen aggregate fluctuations, in developing economies discretionary policy is usually procyclical. 
In addition, in most MENA countries automatic fiscal stabilizers – such as income taxes and 
transfer programs built into the fiscal system – are too small to have a significant smoothing effect 
on aggregate fluctuations. 
The stance of fiscal policy should continue to improve. In Egypt, despite the adjustment efforts 
in the recent years, sizable budget deficits and their financing needs continue to create uncertainties 
about effectiveness of fiscal policy. Other specific features of the budgetary structure constitute a 
challenge for Tunisia and Egypt. These include the difficulty to generate tax revenue, in particular 
for direct tax and rigidities on the expenditure side due to the high share of wage and salaries, 
subsidies, military spending and interest expenditure. 
Countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy requires advanced institutional reforms. Running 
optimal fiscal policies requires a reduction of public indebtedness. This can only be achieved via 
reform of public finances, continued fiscal discipline and sustained economic growth. Enhancing 
and maintaining fiscal discipline will be facilitated by improving the institutional framework in 
which fiscal policy operates, via more effective budgetary management and transparency, and 
eventually via fiscal rules, which so far not being widely used in the region. 
Fiscal policies need to be credibly and sustainably financed. There is consensus that fiscal 
interventions need to be timely in order to be effective, and that mistimed interventions can be 
counter-productive.  This has been a challenge in Tunisia and Egypt where data quality (to identify 
downturns and recoveries in real time) and fiscal institutions (to design and implement any 
proposed spending increases) are weak.    
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